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ARBITRATION AND AWARD-ARBTrrATOR MUST DETERMiNE
VA I nrY oF CONTRACT To ARBITRATE AND COURT WiL NOT STAY
A r=A&Tow ON1 GROUND CONTRACT LAOKS CONSIDERATION
Appellant corporation agreed to employ respondent, a sales promoter,
for life or until he voluntarily quit. The corporation retained power to
terminate the employment agreement if sales fell below specified levels.
The relationship continued satisfactorily for several years until the con-
trolling stockholder of the corporation began to interfere with respondent's
sales policies. Thereafter, respondent wrote the stockholder that he had
"started" to seek employment elsewhere. When the corporation treated
this letter as one of resignation, respondent instituted arbitration proceed-
ings in accordance with a clause in the employment agreement.1 The cor-
poration then petitioned the court 2 to stay the arbitration on the ground
that the employment agreement was invalid for lack of "mutuality of
obligation" and, therefore, the arbitrators had no jurisdiction over the
dispute. The court denied the motion and the appellate division affirmed,
stating that as "there was sufficient consideration for the contract . . .
all questions as to the alleged termination of the contract . . . are for
determination by the arbitrators under the arbitration clause of the agree-
ment." 3 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, but reached its con-
clusion "by a route quite different from that taken by the courts below":
"the question whether the contract lacked mutuality of obligation . . . is
to be determined by the arbitrators, not the court." 4 Exercycle Corp. v.
Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961).
A party to an agreement who seeks the statutory aid of arbitration is
frequently met by one of two related defenses: either that no contract of
any kind was ever made, or, if there was a contract, that no agreement
to arbitrate was part of it. In dealing with such defenses, which raise
almost identical legal problems, 5 the New York courts have generally said
that "arbitration presupposes the existence of a contract to arbitrate," 6
1 The arbitration clause read: "Any dispute arising out of or in connection with
this agreement shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association." Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 332,
174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (1961).
2 Under N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 1450.
3 Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 11 App. Div. 2d 677, 201 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1960).
4 Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174 N.E.2d 463, 464, 214
N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1961).
5See Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 390-91,
171 N.E. 579, 583 (1930) (dictum) : "If . . . [the arbitration] is not pursuant to a
contract, if in truth there is no contract at all or none calling for arbitration, the self-
constituted tribunal is a nullity, without power to bind or loose by force of its decision."
(Emphasis added.)
6 Id. at 389, 171 N.E. at 581 (dictum).
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and for any party denying the existence of such a contract the "regular
courts of justice must be open . . . at some stage for the determination
of the issue." 7 To this end, section 1450 of the New York Civil Practice
Act provides that if "a substantial issue as to the making of the contract"
is raised, the court "shall proceed immediately to the trial thereof," and if
it finds that there was no contract, the arbitration proceeding "shall be
dismissed." Although neither the cases nor the arbitration statute articu-
lates which of several possible meanings of the word "contract" is in-
tended,8 probably both courts and legislature intended to use the word
in its legal senseY The implication of the prior law was well summed up
in a concurring opinion in the instant case:
[T]he legal existence of the arbitral tribunal depends on contract
It is from that agreement between the parties that their very being,
or jurisdiction and power to act, derives. Unless such contract,
when seasonably challenged, is declared valid and enforceable
. . . the arbitral tribunal can never legally come into being.10
By its apparently novel conception of the nature of a contract which
will support arbitration, the majority in the present case tacitly dis-
approved much language in earlier opinions and construed section 1450 in
7 Ibid.; see In the Matter of Princeton Rayon Corp., 309 N.Y. 13, 14, 127 N.E.2d
729, 730 (1955) (court stayed arbitration until there was a trial as to the making of
an agreement to arbitrate) ; In the Matter of Uraga Dock, 6 App. Div. 2d 443, 446,
179 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2?t 773, 159 N.E.2d 212, 186 N.Y.S.2d
669 (1959) ; In the Matter of Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 285 App. Div. 710, 139 N.Y.S.2d
612, af'd, 309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955) ; In the Matter of Metro Plan, Inc.,
257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1939).
8 Professor Corbin notes that the "term contract has been used without much
discrimination to refer to three different things: (1) The series of operative acts of
the parties expressing their assent and resulting in new legal relations; (2) the
physical document executed by the parties as an operative fact in itself and as the
lasting evidence of their having performed the necessary operative acts; (3) the
relations resulting from the operative acts, consisting of a right or right in personain
and the corresponding duties, accompanied by certain powers, privileges and immumi-
ties." Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917).
9 Section 1448 of the New York Civil Practice Act, entitled "Validity of Arbi-
tration Contracts . . . ," permits "two or more persons . . . to . . . contract to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them and such ....
contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." To define "contract," as used
in this section of the arbitration statute, in a merely factual sense would be unreason-
able. For if the word "contract," as first used, means only the written document,
then this meaning must also be given to "contract" when used later in the same section.
Since such a "contract" is there characterized as "valid," one would be led to the
untenable position that a piece of writing, otherwise invalid for lack of consideration,
might, since arbitration clauses are not treated as separable in New York, become
valid merely by the addition of an arbitration clause. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
has stated in the past that since arbitration proceedings are dependent upon the exist-
ence of a "valid and enforceable contract," a party may challenge the existence of such
a contract in a court of law. In the Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N.Y.
467, 471, 43 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1942). Under this use of the word "contract," it would
appear that a court must not only determine the existence of a written document or
oral agreement, but must also determine if these are legally valid and enforceable.
1l Instant case at 339, 174 N.E.2d at 468, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (concurring
opinion).
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a surprising way. The existence of a legally enforceable agreement was
treated as no longer a question for judicial determination, but as one for
arbitration.1 It was enough for the present court that the parties "made
a contract in which they promised each other to arbitrate any differences
which might arise ... ,, 12 This use of the word "contract" was
clarified when the court pointed out that in fact the parties carried out the
terms of their agreement for almost five years. "It may hardly be said,
therefore, that the making of the present agreement is in issue . .. ., 13
"Making of the contract" thus became for the majority in the present case
merely the expression of a mutual desire to arbitrate, whether or not the
entire agreement was legally enforceable. 14  Such a radical redistribution
of the functions of courts and arbitrators in determining the threshhold
question of the existence of a valid contract to arbitrate' 5 raises several
problems as to the jurisdiction of arbitrators which did not receive adequate
discussion in the court's opinion.
The first problem is the extent to which an arbitral determination
that the challenged contract lacks consideration would preclude any further
adjudication of the merits of the dispute. For the arbitrators might still
call for enforcement of the contract, justifying such an award by Rule 42
of the American Arbitration Association which permits them to "grant any
remedy or relief which [they] . . . deem just and equitable . . . ." 16
The court's language in the instant case seems to allow such a result: "once
having agreed to eschew recourse to courts of law and have its disputes
with Maratta settled by arbitrators, Exercycle cannot urge, in opposition
to arbitration, that a court of law would not enforce the agreement." 17
If the arbitrators should determine that Maratta's letter was not a resigna-
11 Instant case at 334, 174 N.E.2d at 464-65, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56.
12 Instant case at 335, 174 N.E.2d at 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
13 Ibid.
14 Under this construction, a court, on a motion to stay arbitration, merely decides
that an arbitration agreement was made and that it purported to give arbitrators
jurisdiction to decide the validity of the whole agreement The court would
continue to determine whether the parties intended that a given dispute be arbitrated,
by examining the wording of the agreement. See Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 300, 169 N.E. 386, 391 (1929) ; In the Matter of Kelley, 240 N.Y.
74, 147 N.E. 363 (1925). In In the Matter of Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 80, 43 N.E.2d
817, 819 (1942), the court stated that it had "no power to grant a motion to compel
arbitration unless the subject-matter is comprised within the agreement to arbitrate
made by the parties .... "
15 No precedent on point is cited for the court's holding that the contract's validity
is to be determined by the arbitrators. The cases cited in support of the court's
position seem to have assumed the existence of a contract supporting the arbitrators'
authority. See, e.g., In the Matter of Terminal Auxiliar Maritima, 6 N.Y.2d 294,
299, 160 N.E.2d 526, 529, 189 N.Y.S.-d 655, 659 (1959). In the Matter of De
Laurentiis, 9 N.Y.2d 503, 509, 174 N.E.2d 736, 738, 215 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (1961),
decided five weeks after the instant case and relying upon it, also held that the arbi-
trators were to determine whether "the agreement on its face is so lacking in mutuality
that it bound neither party and could not produce an arbitrable dispute."
16 ComEiRcaC ARBITRATION RunrEs OF THE AmERIcAN ARBiTRAT N Ass'N § 42,
in STURGES, CASES ON A.maTRATIO' app. III, at 882 (1953).
17 Instant case at 336, 174 N.E.2d at 466, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
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tion, Exercycle might well seek to have the award vacated on the ground
that the arbitrators' decision that the contract was illusory makes any
decision of the resignation issue a transgression of their statutory power.' s
This argument, however, would have to assume that the present case does
not construe the statute so as to permit the arbitrators to make such a
decision. The court's Ianguage-"the question whether the contract lacked
mutuality of obligation . . . is to be determined by the arbitrators" 19.
would support such an assumption, for it would be pointless for the court
to require the arbitrators to decide this issue if it would not affect their
power to make an award. Should the court nevertheless refuse to vacate
an award made in the face of an express arbitral finding of no consideration,
it would be holding, in effect, that consideration is not a requirement for
the enforceability of an agreement containing an arbitration provision.
Although this decision would not do violence to the original intention of
the parties in the instant case, who had been under the impression that a
valid agreement to submit their disputes to arbitration existed, it would
be contrary to the implications of prior decisions in this area 20 and per-
haps unwise in view of the retroactivity with which it would operate.
Since the New York legislature has provided comprehensive procedures for
the enforcement of arbitral awards, a court which proposes to abrogate
the requirement of consideration in contracts containing arbitration clauses
should only do so on the strength of a clear manifestation of legislative
intent.
Even if the present decision only goes so far as to permit arbitrators to
reach the substance of a contract dispute after they first determine that
the contract is valid, two problems remain. It is uncertain from the opinion
ih the instant case whether a court will be able to review an arbitral deci-
sion that the contract is valid and, assuming it will, why the court deferred
the issue to a later stage in the case instead of deciding it at a preliminary
point. In the present case an arbitrator could decide that the agreement
is valid by an honest application of contract law to its terms,2 ' and no court
would have statutory authority to vacate the award solely because it dis-
agreed with the arbitrators on that issue?22 Although there is some author-
Is A court must make an order vacating an award "where the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite
award upon the subject-matter submitted was not made." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT
§ 1462(4). Cf. In the Matter of Morantz, 275 App. Div. 873, 89 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1949)
(per curiam).
19 Instant case at 334, 174 N.E.2d at 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
20 See cases cited note 7 supra; In the Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288
N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493 (1942); Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas &
Co., 253 N.Y. 383, 389, 171 N.E. 579, 581 (1930) (dictum) ; cf. note 9 supra.
21 The several judges who ruled on the contract's validity in the course of liti-
gation in the instant case were themselves divided over this question. See Exercycle
Corp. v. Maratta, 11 App. Div. 2d 677, 201 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1960) ; id. at 678, 201
N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (dissenting opinion) ; instant case at 340, 174 N.E.2d at 469, 214
N.Y.S.2d at 361 (concurring opinion); instant case at 341, 174 N.E.2d at 469, 214
N.Y.S.2d at 362 (dissenting opinion).
22 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1458(2), 1462.
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ity to the effect that an award cannot be vacated on grounds iot expressly
enumerated in the arbitration statute,2 the courts have not been averse
in the past to creating additional grounds.2 4  For example, in -a case in
which the arbitrators had fixed punitive as well as actual damages, the
court quashed the punitive damages because they were not "consistent with
the public and legal policy of the community." 2 5 Therefore, a court ac-
cepting Exercycle's contention that the award should be vacated on the
grounds that the underlying contract lacked mutuality could conceivably
phrase such a decision in terms of "public policy." The trend of New York
decisions, however, seems to be away from such court-created restrictions
on the power of arbitrators.
2 6
To say that the parties made an enforceable contract to arbitrate the
validity of the agreement as a whole implies that the arbitration agreement
is somehow separable from the rest of the agreement and is, independently,
an enforceable contract. 27  But if the contract is not separable-which
seems to be the position of the majority in the instant case 2 8 -then the
arbitrators' jurisdiction to make any award on the contract must be decided
by the same tribunal that adjudicates the validity of the whole contract
Therefore, on a motion to enforce an award in the present case, unless the
court is willing to review the arbitrators' conclusion as to the validity of
the contract, it will be permitting the arbitrators to make a decision which
has traditionally been a condition precedent to any binding arbitration and
which has been said to require judicial determination if the enforcement
is to be consistent with due process.
2 9
2 3 There is at least one case which holds in the alternative that an award cannot
be challenged on grounds not directly within the arbitration statute. See In the
Matter of Congregation Talmud Torah of Flatbush, Inc., 283 App. Div. 892, 129
N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (1954).
24 The New York courts have refused to confirm an award based on a usurious
contract In the Matter of Gale, 176 Misc. 277, 282, 27 N.Y.S.2d 18, 23 (Sup. Ct.
1941), rev'd on other grounds, 262 App. Div. 834, 28 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1941). They
also have refused to confirm an award that would sanction a violation of the state
penal laws. In the Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162
(1949) (alternative holding).
2 5 In the Matter of Publishers' Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 505, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401,
406 (1952).
26 Cf. In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d
377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960), 109 U. PA. L. REv. 744 (1961); In the Matter of
Staklinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
2 7 In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409 (2d
Cir. 1959), the court said "that the [United States] Arbitration Act envisages a dis-
tinction between the entire contract between the parties on the one hand and the
arbitration clause of the contract on the other . . . ." It has been contended that
"the [New York] Arbitration Law should be held to make written arbitration con-
tracts or provisions severable from the general bargain which they may accompany,
to which they may refer, and out of which disputes may arise to be arbitrated, and
that this should be so even where all bargains are reported in a single paper document."
See Sturges, Fraudulent Inducement as a Defense to the Enforcement of Arbitration
Contracts, 36 YALE L.J. 866, 872 (1927). See generally Nussbaum, The "Separability
Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rxv. 609 (1940).
28 See instant case at 340, 174 N.E.2d at 468, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61 (concurring
opinion).
29 See Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 389,
171 N.E. 579, 581 (1930) (dictum) : "If a party to a controversy denies the existence
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It would seem that unless some theory of "separability" is adopted,
a court may eventually be obliged to rule on the validity of the employment
contract in the instant case if a subsequent award is sought to be enforced.
It is not clear then what policy the majority intended to promote by
postponing this issue until after the arbitrators have dealt with it. Perhaps
the court thought that the intertwined legal and commercial issues involved
in this contract could be better clarified by exploiting the expertise of the
arbitrators. Or, more pragmatically, it may have thought that many
arbitrations raising similar issues will never be ultimately challenged; the
practice of deferring the issue of validity might serve to lighten the load
on the courts and to strengthen the role of arbitrators. Perhaps the court
has only delayed a crucial decision for no good purpose. But regardless of
the court's future actions, the problems raised by the present decision
should have been more fully articulated. If "contract" retains any of its
traditional meaning in the context of commercial arbitration, the question
of validity should not be too premature to be raised in a petition to stay
arbitration, yet too late to be raised in a motion to vacate a subsequent
award.
BAIL-RIGHT TO BiL DuRING F DiRAL TRIAL Is SUBTECT TO
JUDGE'S INHERENT POWER To RECOmmI DEFENDANTS To INsuRE
OIDERLY PROGRESS OF TRIAL
Defendants had been released on bail while awaiting trial for narcotics
violations in the Southern District of New York. After its commence-
ment, the trial was beset by delays,' and, because of depletion of the jury,
a mistrial threatened unless the proceedings could be completed with dis-
patch. The district judge, on his own initiative, remanded all defendants-
including those not responsible for the delays 2-- to custody. On appeal,
the Second Circuit rejected defendants' contention that the right to bail in
a noncapital case is absolute until conviction, holding that it was within the
discretion of the district judge to remand during trial, and that the judge
of the contract and with it the jurisdiction of the irregular tribunal, the regular courts
of justice must be open to him at some stage for the determination of the issue. The
right to such a determination, either at the beginning or at the end of the arbitration
or in resistance to an attempted enforcement of the award, is assured by the Consti-
tution as part of its assurance of due process of law."
I One of the defendants disappeared before the trial began; several were absent
from the trial for varying periods because of illness, and at least one defendant's
sickness appeared to be feigned; one defendant refused to accept new counsel when
his attorney became ill; and another was injured in a seemingly planned auto accident.
Two and one-half months after the trial opened, there had been only twenty-five trial
days. United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1961).
2 Of the nine defendants involved in this appeal, only three had been involved
in any delays. Ibid.
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had not abused his discretion in this case.3 United States v. Bentvena, 288
F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961).
Several weeks later, at the opening of a trial in the Southern District
of California, the prosecution moved to recommit the defendants, who
were free on bail. The trial judge granted the motion because he feared
the defendants might abscond during the trial. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that although it was within the discretion of the trial court to re-
mand to custody during trial, the government had not established a rea-
sonable foundation for the court's belief that defendants were likely to flee.4
In opposing renewed applications for bail, the prosecution introduced evi-
dence that one of its principal witnesses was being intimidated.5 The dis-
trict court denied the applications, and the court of appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that ample foundation had been established for the court's exercise of
its discretion.0 Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961).
The right to bail in federal courts has both constitutional 7 and statu-
tory 8 bases. The constitutional safeguard against excessive bail has been
said to guarantee the right of a defendant to be enlarged on bail, not merely
to limit the amount at which bail may be set, if it is allowed at all.9 This
right has been characterized as absolute before trial,10 but no case has
considered the constitutional right to ball during the trial itself. The
relevant part of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Before
Conviction. A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall
be admitted to bail." 11 Pending sentence, however, admission to bail is left
to the judge's discretion, 12 and pending appeal a court may deny bail if the
3 Subsequent applications for bail to Mr. Justice Harlan were denied. Fernandez
v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct 642 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1961).
4 Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1961).
5 The intimidation consisted of anonymous telephoned threats and an attack on
the witness by unidentified assailants. Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 686, 689
(9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961).
6 Having held that denial of bail was justified on the basis of the threats, the
court did not decide whether a reasonable basis had been established for the lower
court's alternative ground-that defendants might abscond. Carbo v. United States,
mspra note 3, at 690.
7 U.S. CoxsT. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required ... "
8 The original bail provision was § 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, cl. 20, 1 Stat.
91. Subsequent revisions did not materially change the original. See Act of April
10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44. Bail is currently governed by FaD. R. Cmnm. P. 46
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-45 (1958).
9 United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (Butler, Circuit Justice, 1926) ; Trimble
v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). Contra, Wagner v. United States, 250
F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1957). Several state courts have held that "excessive bal' pro-
visions in their state constitutions do not guarantee any right to bail. See, e.g.,
Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67, 54 S.E. 822 (1906); People ex rel. Shapiro v.
Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943).
10 United States v. Motlow, supra note 9, at 659.
11 FED. R. CRim. P. 46(a) (1). This was substantially a restatement of existing
law. See Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule 46(a) (1), Appendix to 18 U.S.C.
at 3437 (1958). The only significant change was the addition of the caption, "Before
Conviction."
12 FED. R. CR=!. P. 32(a): "Pending sentence the court may commit the defendant
or continue or alter the bail. . ."
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appeal is "frivolous or taken for delay." 13 The rules explicitly provide
for recommitment during these periods. 14  In United States v. Rice 15
relied on as authority by the present cases 1'--the defendant was arrested
and ordered to custody during his trial. The district court denied a sub-
sequent application for bail, saying, "conditions are such that . . the
presence of Rice during the trial . . - can only be secured and the jury
protected against unlawful approaches and attempts to corrupt by holding
him in actual custody." 17
Both Rice and the instant cases relied on a power of the trial court
which was said to be inherent in its duty to insure the efficient administra-
tion of criminal justice.,8 However, no mention was made of any direct
statutory authority for this power; the only precedent offered in the instant
cases was the Rice decision.' 9 The caption "Before Conviction" in the
federal rules negates any suggestion that the absolute right to bail was
intended to be limited to the pretrial period.20 In addition, since the rules
explicitly provide for remand after conviction, 21 silence as to remand dur-
ing the trial indicates that there was no intention to confer such a power.
Not only do the federal rules militate against the present decisions, but
the existence of criminal sanctions against those who obstruct justice either
by delaying trial or by threatening witnesses 22 and the power to raise the
Is FED. Cum. P. 46(a) (2).
14 FED. R. Caim. P. 32(a), 46(a)(2).
15 92 Fed. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). This is the only federal case involving
the right to bail during trial, with the exception of Hood v. United States, 23 F.2d
472, 475 (8th Cir. 1927), in which the defendant had absented himself from the court-
room during the trial. A defendant's failure to appear at trial is a breach of condition
of his bail bond and is a ground for forfeiture of bail. FED. R. Cum. P. 46(f) (1).
A similar law was in force at the time of the Hood case. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839,
ch. 36, § 6, 5 Stat 322.
16 United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Carbo v. United
States, 288 F.2d 686, 688 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961)
(by implication, see Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282, 285-86 (9th Cir. (1961)).
17 192 Fed. at 720. In Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285, 287 (1894), a post-
conviction bail case, and in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), which was concerned
with the problem of excessive bail, the Supreme Court, in dicta, referred to an absolute
right to bail "before trial" and "before conviction" interchangeably, indicating that
it was not dealing with the period between the beginning of trial and conviction. The
court in United States v. Bentvena cited both Hudson and Stack as characterizing
the right to bail as absolute before trial only. 288 F.2d at 444-45.
18 United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Carbo v. United
States, 288 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Rice, 192 Fed. 720, 721
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
19The court in Bentvena also cited Hood v. United States, 23 F.2d 472, 475
(8th Cir. 1927). See note 15 supra.
20 The government in the Carbo case made the argument that despite the heading
"Before Conviction" the "primary thrust" of Rule 46(a) (1) was aimed at the period
between arrest and trial. Memorandum for the United States in Opposition to Appli-
cation for Bail Pending Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 7, Carbo v. United States,
288 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961). Under this inter-
pretation the phrase "Before Conviction" is rendered meaningless.
21 FED. R. Cnm. P. 32(a), 46(a)(2).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958). The contempt power, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958), would
not extend to the actions of defendants in Bentvena, see note 1 s-pra, under the rule
in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1940) ("so near" to the court "as to
obstruct the administration of justice" connotes spatial proximity, not causal relation).
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amount of bail to insure a defendant's appearance 2 provide the district
courts with means to cope with the obstructions presented in the instant
cases. The right to bail is predicated upon the presumption that a crim-
inal defendant is innocent until a trial has decided the issue of his guilt.24
Freedom on bail precludes punishment before conviction and assures the
defendant a full opportunity to consult with counsel and prepare an ade-
quate defense.2 5 These policies are as vital during trial as they are before
it. The effect of the present cases is to distinguish between the trial and
pretrial periods because of the desire for orderly proceedings. The im-
portance of this desire is not to be underestimated, but in the face of statu-
tory language to the contrary and the availability of sanctions intended to
keep the trial free from interference and delay, the court should not be
permitted to impose a standard for admission to bail which is even stricter
than the standard which exists during the postconviction period,26 when
conviction has dissolved the presumption of innocence.
The courts' exercise of their asserted discretion in these cases was as
questionable as the legitimacy of the power they claimed. The stated test
for the use of the power to recommit during trial is whether or not defend-
ants are likely to disrupt the proceedings and prevent the orderly progress
of the trial,27 to which is added the stricture of Stack v. Boyle,2 the only
Supreme Court decision concerning preconviction bail, that in bail cases a
court must examine the record of each defendant individually, and when
there is more than one defendant the court must discriminate among them32
Though this test might have been met with respect to those defendants in
Bentvena whose past actions gave ground for fear that the proceedings
would continue to be delayed,3 0 the district judge held that the past trial
delays were sufficient cause for remanding all the defendants. 31 The threats
relied on as the ground for recommitment in the Carbo case are relevant
to the exercise of the asserted discretion only insofar as they indicate a
2318 U.S.C. § 3143 (1958). Both the Rice case and the first Carbo decision
mention a likelihood of absconding as a ground for recommitment during trial. How-
ever, Justice Jackson, in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (separate opinion),
said, "Admission to bail always involves a risk that the accused will take flight.
That is a calculated risk which the law takes as the price of our system of justice."
24 Stack v. Boyle, supra note 23, at 4.
2
5 Ibid. As to the measurable effect of detention upon a defendant's ability to
prepare his defense, see Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 725-27 (1958).
26 The standard for postconviction bail is whether or not the appeal is "frivolous
or taken for delay." FED. R. CRIm. P. 46(a) (2). "[N]ormally bail should be allowed
pending appeal, and it is only in an unusual case that denial is justified." Rhodes v.
United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960). The burden is on the government
to show that postconviction bail should not be allowed. Ward v. United States, 76
Sup. Ct 1063 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice, 1956).
27 United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444, 445 (2d Cir. 1961); Carbo v.
United States, 288 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1961).
28342 U.S. 1 (1951).
2 Id. at 9 (separate opinion) : "Each defendant stands before the bar of justice
as an individual. . . . Each accused is entitled to any benefits due to his good record,
and misdeeds or a bad record should prejudice only those who are guilty of them."
30 See note 1 s=pra.
31 United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 446 (2d Cir. 1961).
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possible interference with the orderly progress of the trial, for only to this
extent do they relate to the premise of the power-the efficient adminis-
tration of criminal justice. But the evidence relied on to support the
remand did not even purport to show that defendants, either as a group or
individually, were engaged in or directly responsible for any of the activi-
ties which threatened to interfere with the trial.3
2
By creating a power to remand defendants during trial, and by the
manner in which they permit this power to be exercised, the present cases
undermine the federal rules on bail and some of the policies behind them.33
The appearance of the instant cases and another recent case upholding
remand 34 fifty years after the last such decision 3 5 may mark a real trend
in the federal courts to recommit criminal defendants during trial. Under
the present constitutional and statutory system a poor man may be effec-
tively denied bail by its being set at a level which is beyond his reach yet
not excessive under the Eighth Amendment, while a rich man can raise
any amount which is not constitutionally excessive.36 The present cases
correct this inequity by permitting the use of standards whose effect does
not depend on the defendant's finances. But such a change is a matter for
legislative-and perhaps constitutional-determination, not for judicial
decision within the present statutory framework.
EXPROPRIATION-CUBAN ExPRoPIATION HELD INVALID
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNENFORCEABLE BY ASSIGNEE OF
CUBA IN UNTED STATES CoURT
Defendant broker contracted to purchase sugar from Compania
Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey (CAy), a Cuban corporation. Before
it could ship the sugar out of the country, CAV was nationalized along
32 If the prosecution had shown that by recommitting the defendants the court
could successfully prevent further threats and insure the orderly progress of the trial,
remand would have been justified under the court's standard. But the government
conceded that it had not made such a showing. Memorandum for the United States
in Opposition to Application for Bail Pending Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp.
8-9, Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861
(1961). Indeed, unless the defendant is the object of harassment or violence, it is
difficult to see how his incarceration could ever operate to alleviate obstructions for
which he is not responsible.
33 The instant cases may also raise a serious constitutional question. If the
absolute right to bail before trial is constitutionally guaranteed-the Supreme Court
has not passed on this question, see note 9 supra-and there is no valid distinction
between the pretrial and trial periods, denial of bail during trial would violate the
Eighth Amendment.
34 Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1961).
35 United States v. Rice, 192 Fed. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
36 See Foote, Introduction: The Comparative Study of Conditiomal Release, 108
U. PA. L. Rv. 290, 296-98 (1960).
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with other American-owned enterprises in Cuba.' In order to remove the
sugar, defendant broker made a contract with an agency of the Cuban
government which was substantially similar to its earlier contract with
CAy. The sugar was sold in Africa and the proceeds remitted to the
broker in New York, where they were sequestered by defendant receiver
on behalf of CAV's creditors and stockholders. 2 Plaintiff, an assignee of
Cuba's rights under the second contract, then sued the receiver and the
broker, alleging Cuba's title to the sugar under the nationalization decree
and right to the proceeds under the contract with the broker. On a motion
for summary judgment, the district court held that, although it was pre-
cluded by the "act of state" doctrine from questioning acts of the Cuban
government under either the public policy of the forum or the organic law
of Cuba, such acts could be examined under international law. It further
held that the nationalization decree was invalid because it contravened
international law on three grounds.3  Plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied and the complaint dismissed. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
When litigation between private parties requires municipal courts to
adjudicate the status of property affected by foreign law, principles of con-
flict of laws designate the lez rei sitae at the time of the relevant transac-
tion as that which governs its validity.4 Even though litigants frequently
challenge the validity of the law so chosen, American courts have cus-
tomarily refused to question the acts of a foreign sovereign. This policy,
generally called the "act of state" doctrine, assumes that judicial examina-
tion of such acts would "vex the peace of nations." 6 It also reflects the
1 See Exec. Power Res. No. 1, pursuant to Law No. 851, Gaceta Oficial de Cuba,
July 7, 1960, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 382 n.14
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
2 Under N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. AcT § 977-b(1) : "An action may be instituted in the
supreme court for the appointment of a receiver of the assets in this state of a foreign
corporation, whenever such foreign corporation has assets . . . within the state of
New York, and (a) it has heretofore been . . . nationalized . . . ." See Schwartz
v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, 208 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.
1960), Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 590 (1961).
3 The court held that the nationalization was totally unrelated to any public use,
that it discriminated against nationals of one country, and that the method of com-
pensation provided was illusory. See generally Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55
A.m. J. INT'L L. 585, 590-91, 600-10 (1961). The growing practice of nationalizing
with nominal or no compensation casts doubt on whether nationalization without
compensation continues to be contrary to international law, which is, in effect, the
sum of what civilized nations customarily do. See generally Note, Expropriation of
Alien Property, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1960).
4 See Cammell v. Sewell, 5 Hurl. & N. 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 615 (Ex. 1860);
Carlston, Nationalization: An Analytical Approach, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 405, 411-13
(1959) ; Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public Inter-
national Law, 52 CoLuM. L. Rrv. 561, 580 (1952) ; cf. Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F.2d
28 (5th Cir. 1960). But see Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before
Foreign Courts-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 801, 802 (1960).
See Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp.,
28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y.
220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); RE, FoRE GN CONFISCATIONs 80-127 (1951).
60etjen v. Central Leather Co., supra note 5, at 304.
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desire of courts not to meddle with issues of international politics, which
properly belong to the executive. The "act of state" doctrine finds its
strongest language and most rigid application in cases involving immovable
property or personal rights situated in the territory of the foreign sover-
eign.7 In these cases a court has little power to alter the effects of the
foreign act and is chary of rendering a judgment which it is powerless to
enforce without political aid."
The "act of state" doctrine does not apply to acts of a foreign sover-
eign which must operate extraterritorially in order to be effective. Thus,
when property is located within the forum state at the time of an attempted
expropriation, American courts generally have refused to recognize a
shift in ownership which violates the policy of the forum.9 Since there has
been no reduction to possession by the expropriating state, courts need
not consider the danger of disrupting the possession of a person who may
have relied on the act of state.
10
When, however, a foreign sovereign has acted to expropriate proper-
ties which function in the production of export commodities," and such
commodities subsequently come within the power of the court, an especially
delicate situation arises. In the typical case, the former owner of an
expropriated industry attempts to recover "his property" from a customer
of the expropriating government. If American courts were to refuse to
7 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ; Pasos v. Pan American
Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956).8 In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), plaintiff
charged defendant with wrongfully inducing a foreign government to seize plaintiff's
property illegally in order to help defendant secure a monopoly of the banana market
in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court held that it could not deny the legality
of the sovereign's act within its own territory and concluded that the American
statute could not govern actions beyond United States territorial jurisdiction. Cf.
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 871 (1956).
9 See Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Moscow Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 768 (1939), aff'd per
curian, 309 U.S. 624 (1940) (evenly divided court); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York
Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934); Bollack v. Soidti G6nfrale, etc., en
France, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1942), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 653, 56 N.E.2d
253 (1944); cf. Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kospont Budapest, 279 App. Div. 528, 535,
111 N.Y.S.2d 75, 82, modified per curiam, 304 N.Y. 704, 107 N.E.2d 604 (1952).
Compare Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
635 (1939), with Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951).
10 In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), plaintiff attempted to
replevy hides from an American who traced his title to the insurgent Mexican forces
of General Carranza, which had seized the hides as an occupation measure. After
the Carranza regime was recognized as the government of Mexico, the seizure was
upheld as the official act of the duly constituted Mexican government. In more
extreme situations, courts have supported the title of even a third party purchaser
with notice. See Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1940).
"1 The Mexican oil field expropriation in 1938 is typical. As in the instant case
the Department of State had protested the expropriation as illegal; but it was held
that oil purchased from the Mexican government and imported into the United States
could not be recovered by the original owner of the fields. Eastern States Petroleum
Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See Baade, supra
note 4, at 809-10.
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recognize the validity of the expropriation, prospective customers would be
subject to adverse judgments in favor of the former owner. Few would
risk the danger of double payment, and the result would be an effective
partial blockade of a valuable export commodity. A "blockade" of this
sort would reach beyond the resolution of particular disputes and invade
the political domain of the executive branch, perhaps having a serious
effect upon the foreign relations of the United States.1 2  In such cases,
courts have refused to inquire into the validity of the expropriation,
13
even when the property involved was that of an American national.14
This "doctrine," usually expressed in language indicating that it is regarded
as a binding rule,15 appears to preclude any consideration of international
law.' 6 Further, though a method of expropriation may offend a court's
conceptions of due process in the taking of property, any attempt to give
a remedy would involve the extension of judicial action into areas with
which the court is not equipped to deal. When such a dilemma exists,
and the court faces possible political repercussions from its judgment, there
is incentive to abstain from positive action and let the loss lie where it has
12 See Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 Am.
J. INT'L L. 141 (1960). But see Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L
L. 826, 834-35 (1959). In any litigation involving foreign affairs, courts recognize
the paramount authority of the Department of State. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ; Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1951) ; note 32 infra. Deference to the executive has been so strong that the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has refused to question the validity of Nazi racial de-
crees without an executive declaration that such a course would not hamper the nego-
tiation of reparations agreements. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr&res Soci~t6 Anonymej
163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). In the same litigation, after
the Department of State gave the assurances requested, the court indicated that it
would examine the decrees. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoom-
vaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). This deference has been heavily
criticized. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,
40 Air. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946); Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234 (1960); Comment, 57
YALE L.J. 108 (1947).
13 See cases cited note 5 supra.
14 See Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
1 5 See Re, op. cit. supra note 5, at 32-33. While foreign law is found as a fact,
it governs like law. According to the language of the courts, when a foreign act of
state is presented and proved, it is followed as if it were a "rule of decision." See
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) : "Every sovereign State is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own border." Accord, Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Pasos v. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Von
Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947). However, the application of
the doctrine, as distinct from its expression, is not governed by such rigidity. On
the contrary, it would seem to depend on a balancing of conflicting policies, influenced
by factors of a political nature, including recognition of the foreign government. See
Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on International Law Norms, 51 COLUM. L. Rxv.
710 (1951). Nationalizing acts of an unrecognized sovereign have been accorded
validity. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933) ;
cf. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbaln-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938).
But where the foreign state is unrecognized, the validity of the act of state is more
open to examination under the public policy of the forum. Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv.
234, 253-57 (1960).
16 See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 28d, comment e (Tent Draft
No. 4, 1960) ; instant case at 380.
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fallen. 7  Thus the "act of state" doctrine appears to be no more than a
convenient shorthand for a court's unwillingness to take any action which
might conflict with executive policies.
Contemporary scholarly debate over the "act of state" doctrine turns
on the creation of exceptions which would alleviate the unfortunate results
of its rigorous application and yet preserve its salutary effect in appro-
priate cases. Three positions have been taken: The older belief is that the
doctrine should be strictly adhered to; Is the Bar Association of the City
of New York advocates that the doctrine should not be applied unless the
Department of State officially requests the court to abstain from examining
the legality of the act of state; "I and the American Law Institute's draft
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States proposes
that the doctrine should be consistently applied except when an act is chal-
lenged as contrary to international law.20 The approach of the present
case resembled that of the Restatement, but the court seemed to rest its
exception also on the ground that executive policy explicitly called for non-
recognition of the Cuban expropriation decrees and on the unrelated ground
that the Cuban government, rather than a private litigant, was directly
invoking "the aid of this court in implementing its decree." 2 ' The first
rationale has the quality more of an ad hoc justification for action in an
extreme political situation than of a reasoned exception to the doctrine.
The second highlights a factual situation which might have obviated the
court's use of international law.
In the usual expropriation case, the act of state is relied on as an
affirmative defense to an action to reclaim expropriated property. Both
judicial reluctance to act in areas of executive prerogative and the reliance
of the defendant-frequently a disinterested customer of the expropriating
country-upon the act of state inhibit a court from deciding that the act
was invalid. In the present case, however, the act of state formed the
very basis of the plaintiff's cause of action.m The court did not face a
completed sale by the expropriating government to an innocent third
party; on the contrary, it was asked to consummate the sale for Cuba.
It recognized that if it were rigidly to invoke the "act of state" doctrine,
it would be obliged to act affirmatively in the enforcement of a foreign
17 Probably the most extreme example is Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res
Soci~t6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). See
note 12 supra.
Is See Reeves, supra note 12.
19 14 RECoRD or N.Y.C.B.A. 228 (1959) ; see Hyde, Act of State Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959).
20 See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 28d, comment e (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1960).
21 Instant case at 381.
22 The instant case presents a fact situation unlikely to arise often. Most revolu-
tionary governments may be expected to consolidate their acquisition of property,
particularly export commodities, by requiring cash in advance from the buyer. In
the instant case it is quite probable that, in the wake of hasty retaliatory decrees,
Cuban authorities were disorganized in their control of the export of expropriated
properties.
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decree which it regarded as obnoxious to the public policy of the forum.23
Yet the court thought itself precluded by precedent from examining the
validity of the Cuban decree in the light of that policy.2 4 And so the court
turned to international law to find the criteria by which t6 declare the decree
invalid. This was an unnecessary excursion into an area in which the
principles of law are elusive,25 political repercussions are imminent,2 6 and
pronouncements of a municipal court have little extraterritorial effect save
to offend a foreign sovereign.
27
The cases cited by the court to prevent it from holding the Cuban
decree up to its own standards of public policy all arose in the usual posture
of a suit between private parties.m 2 They support no more than the proposi-
tion that a court, for many reasons, some of them political, will not declare
a foreign act of state to be invalid in order to resolve litigation between
private suitors. The novel posture of the present case, however, freed the
2 3 Instant case at 381. Compare State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953), in which a foreign state was permitted to recover
bonds which it had expropriated in exile during World War II in order to protect
the true owners! rights against the Nazi invaders. In that case, the State Depart-
ment had expressly sanctioned the recovery of looted securities which had found their
way to the United States, and the court held the decree consistent with United States
public policy.
24 Instant case at 379-80.
25 See note 3 supra. Compare Baade, supra note 4, at 808-814, with Domke,
Foreign Nationalizations, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 603-616 (1961).
2 6 The very nature of international law, as the "practice" of nations, militates
against its being above national influences. Even if there were such a body of law,
its interpretation in the light of national policies would have national overtones.
This has been the experience of foreign courts. In the dispute over the nationalization
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Iran, an English court found that the nationali-
zation was contrary to international law and refused to recognize it. Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (Sup. Ct. Aden). On the other hand,
courts of Italy and Japan, adjudicating the title to oil imported by their own nationals
from Iran, refused to invalidate the decree. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co.,
Civil Court of Rome, Sept. 13, 1954, [1955] 1 Foro Italiano 256, [1955] INT'L L. REP.
23; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Iremitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, Dist. Ct. Tokyo,
appeal dismissed, High Court of Tokyo, 1953, [1953] INTIL L. REP. 305, 312
(abridged); O'Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 INT'L & COsrI.
L.Q. 267 (1955). Similarly, in the dispute over the nationalization of Dutch tobacco
concessions by Indonesia, Dutch courts refused to recognize the nationalization since
it found it was against international law, whereas German courts, adjudicating the
title to tobacco imported by German nationals, recognized the decree. Domke, Indo-
nesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 Am. 3. INT'L L. 305
(1960) ; Baade, supra note 4. Baade concludes that a court is "quite free to decide,
in accordance with its own conflict of laws rules, whether to recognize the effectiveness
of an expropriation carried out . . . against [a nonational of the expropriating
state] . . . " even though the property was within the jurisdiction of the foreign
state. Id. at 835.
27 But see instant case at 382 & n.12, where the court asserts that the only effec-
tive enforcement of international law is by municipal courts.
28 In all the cases cited by the court, instant case at 380, the act of state was
relied on as a plea in bar to a suit either on a personal right, see Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) ; Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y.
474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938) (German racial decree legalized discharge of Jew from
employment in Germany under a contract made in Germany), or for the specific
return of the property, see Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) ; Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
[1921] K.B. 532.
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court from the need to declare the foreign act invalid and therefore from
the rationale and authority of the cases on which it relied. Because Cuba,
through its agent, actively sought the aid of a United States district court,
it also submitted to the rules and customs of that forum and to its public
policyY2 Without ever passing upon the international validity of the
Cuban decree, the court might have refused to become the agent for car-
rying out an act repugnant to its sense of sound public policy.80 This
disposition would have amounted to an abstention from action, the money
would have remained where it was, and the court would have avoided
pronouncing upon the validity of a foreign decree. Such a result would
have been more in harmony with the policy underlying the "act of state"
doctrine-that courts should restrain themselves in areas which are essen-
tially political.31 And by obviating recourse to international law, it would
have freed the court from the embarassment which a formal determination
of the validity of the Cuban decree would produce in the event that Depart-
ment of State policy should veer 3 2 or litigation arise in which the decree
may be invoked as an affirmative defense.33 Except for extreme cases in
which clear executive policy requires enforcement of foreign acts of state
regardless of the court's conviction as to local policy,34 affirmative disposi-
tion by an American court need not be made when the act alleged by a
sovereign to support its complaint is repugnant to the policy of the forum.
29 Cf. National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1954) (counterclaim
against sovereign plaintiff).
8o See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLum.
L. REv. 969, 980 (1956): "In a world in which despotic governments exist, our
courts should not become the handmaidens of tyrants." Compare, with regard to
valid contracts whose enforcement would promote undesirable ends, Stearns v. Wil-
liams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 290, 240 P.2d 833, 837, 842 (1952) ; 6 CoaBiN, CONTRACTS
§ 1375 (1951). See also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (penal statutes
not entitled to full faith and credit). See generally 6 CoRDiN, CONTRACTS §§ 1373-1541
passim (1951, Supp. 1961).
31 See notes 12-17 .mpra and accompanying text. This attitude has its domestic
application. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
3 2 In the wake of troubles over "highjacked" airliners, executive policy has been
to seek a compromise which would forestall similar incidents and effect the return
of a United States airliner held by Cuba. Thus, in recent litigation in which creditors
libeled a Cuban ship which had been commandeered and sailed to the United States,
the Department of State recognized the Cuban claim to immunity. The ship was
consequently ordered released. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., Admiralty Nos.
8220-24, E.D. Va., Aug. 29, 1961, aff'd per curiam, Civil No. 8448, 4th Cir., Sept. 8,
1961. "[N]o policy with respect to international relations is so fixed that it cannot
be varied in the wisdom of the Executive. Flexibility, not uniformity, must be the
controlling factor in times of strained international relations.' Ibid., in Appendix
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 22, Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., Civil No.
8448, 4th Cir., Sept. 8, 1961.
33 Such litigation has already begun. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
27 F.R.D. 255, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
34 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Ozanic v. United States,
188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951). Pink heralded a drastic change in court policy. Earlier,
courts had refused to recognize Soviet expropriation decrees as having effect against
property situated in the United States. Subsequently they were required to recognize
claims of the United States based on the assignment of Russian claims under these
decrees.
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INCOME TAX-UnoPo&TED AssocIATIoN WHICH AciHmvEs
ADVANTAGES Or CORPORATIOIN FOR PURPOSES OF SPECIFIC VENTURE
HEnI A CORPORATION For TAX PURPOSES
Taxpayer and two others purchased oil and gas leases on behalf of
about seventy investors. In order that the venture not be taxed as a cor-
poration,' the purchasers conveyed an undivided fractional interest in the
leases to each investor in exchange for his investment and share of initial
drilling expenses. Under a contract containing no termination date and
providing for free transferability of interests, each investor assumed a
proportionate part of later production expenses and reserved the right
either to take his share of any oil and gas produced in kind or to dispose of
it separately. Each investor also executed a power of attorney, revocable
on ten days' notice, authorizing any two of the three original purchasers
to develop the leases and market production. Taxpayer, as an investor in
the enterprise, claimed an individual income tax deduction for his share
of intangible drilling costs.2 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue dis-
allowed the deduction on the ground that since the entire arrangement
constituted an "association" taxable as a corporation, its expenses were
deductible only by the association. A federal district court held for the
taxpayer,3 but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding
that a balancing of the corporate and noncorporate features of the organiza-
tion showed that the venture was properly taxable as a corporation. United
States v. Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 4 and several of its antecedents 5
define the term "corporation" to include "associations, joint-stock com-
panies, and insurance companies"; but there is no statutory definition of
1This is a common desire of oil and gas investors. See Early, The Investors
Group: Setting Up an Oil and Gas Venture From the Tax Standpoint, 5TH INST.
ON On. & GAS L. & TAX. 451, 452-57 (1954); Shepherd, Some Problens of Ad-
ministering Oil and Gas Properties Having Large Numbers of Owners, 12TH INsT.
ON On. & GAS L. & TAX. 239, 241-42 (1961). The actions of taxpayer and his asso-
ciates show that from the beginning they were consciously trying to avoid taxation
as a corporation and yet to centralize management of the venture. At first the leases
were placed in trust, and the trustees were empowered to develop the leases. The
trust was revoked almost immediately, because it would not have allowed the investors
to deduct expenses of the venture individually. Instant case at 856; see Helvering v.
Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Nashville Trust Co. v. Cotros, 120 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 680 (1941).
2 Under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263(c) ; see H.R. Con. Res. 50, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945); Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(m)-16 (1943). The proposed Regulations
under the 1954 Code are Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960).
3 Stierwalt v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 770 (D. Wyo. 1960), McLane, Recent
Developnents in, Oil and Gas Taxation, 12TH INsT. ON On. & GAS L. & TAX. 463,
501-03 (1961).
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (3).
5 Revenue Act of 1919, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1058; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§2(2), 42 Stat. 227; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 2(a) (2), 43 Stat. 253; Revenue
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 2 (a) (2), 44 Stat. 9; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 701 (a) (2),
45 Stat. 878; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 1111(a) (2), 47 Stat. 289; Revenue
Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 801(a) (2), 48 Stat. 771 ; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 1001
(a) (2), 49 Stat. 1756; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 901(a) (2), 52 Stat. 583; Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 38, § 3797 (a) (3), 53 Stat. 469.
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"association." Starting with Morrissey v. Commissioner,6 two criteria
have been laid down for finding an "association." First, the enterprise in
question must consist of associates who have joined in a common business
enterprise for the purpose of sharing profits.7 Rulings under the 1939
Code s with respect to oil and gas "operators' agreements" 9 suggested
that coowners of oil and gas properties could prevent the inference of a
joint profit objective by permitting production to be taken in kind or sold
on behalf of the individual owners rather than the group.' 0 Second, the
enterprise must bear a substantial resemblance to a corporation." Since
most corporations have continuous life, centralized management, transfer-
able beneficial interests, and limited liability, and hold title to investment
property in a common organizational name, these attributes have been
considered in finding the necessary resemblance, 12 although the absence
of one or two of them has not prevented such a finding.
13
In deciding 'whether the organization in the present case had a joint
profit objective, the court looked to the practical expectations of the in-
vestors. This approach enabled the court to point to the fact that the right
of the investors to take in kind was a "technical right . . . admittedly
impractical in use," and to find the "essence" of the venture to be "a joint
6296 U.S. 344 (1935) ("business trust" taxable as a corporation).
7 Commissioner v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 142 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 764 (1944); Hamilton Depositors Corp. v. Nicholas, 111 F.2d 385
(10th Cir. 1940).
8 I.T. 3930, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 126; I.T. 3948, 1949-1 Cum. BUL. 161.
9 Operators' agreements differ from the arrangement in the present case chiefly
in that they are entered into by the owners of specific properties among themselves
and with an operator who is to conduct the drilling, while the relationship here was
between each coowner of the lease and his agents, with an apparent absence of any
contractual relationship among the members. Despite this difference, there are
several similarities between the two types. They both rest on a tenancy in common
in the property; the coowners in both cases reserve the right to take their share of
production in kind or to dispose of it separately; and coowners are liable for a pro-
portionate share of drilling and production costs and for any claims against the group.
10I.T. 3930, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 126, 128: "[I]t seems clear that if the joint
objective is limited to a development and the extraction and processing of minerals
. . . for division in kind or for sale for the accounts of the several participants
individually, the test of a joint venture for joint profit is not met." I.T. 3948, 1949-1
Cum. BULL. 161, 162: "[U]nder I.T. 3930, the same representative or representatives
may not act for more than one of the coowners (including himself) without creating
an association taxable as a corporation as respects the coowners so represented,
linless sruch authorization is for the time being only (i.e., revocable at will), because,
in such a case collective irrevocable representative capacity indicative of an organi-
zation with a joint profit objective would be present." (Emphasis added.)
11 Commissioner v. Rector & Davidson, 111 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 672 (1940); Commissioner v. Horseshoe Lease Syndicate, 110 F.2d 748
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 666 (1940).
12 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
13 E.g., Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.
1945) (limited liability); Nashville Trust Co. v. Cotros, 120 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.),
judgment amended, 122 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 680 (1941) (cen-
tralized title) ; see Smith, Associations Classified as Corporations Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 461, 531-32 (1946). For a tabulation of the effect
of specific corporate attributes on the question of substantial resemblance and a
discussion of the rationale behind the requirement of a joint profit objective, see Sneed,
More About Associations in the Oil and Gas Industry, 33 TExAs L. Rxv. 168, 184-93
(1954).
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investment with the goal of a joint profit." 14 This is the first appellate
court case since 1949 in a field where the forms of business organization
have become much more complex than those described in the rulings under
the 1939 Code; 5 but writers had expressed the view that these rulings
could be applied to similar ventures.1 6 The court's rejection of the rulings
in this closely analogous situation ' 7 should disappoint investors who relied
on compliance with them as a means of avoiding being charged with a
joint profit objective. On the other hand, the court's approach injects
substance into the term "joint profit objective," which is used, but not
defined, in recently promulgated Treasury Regulations.' s
The court's solution of the corporate characteristic questions involved
in the instant case may also indicate an approach for the future under the
new regulations, which deal with this problem only in the most general
fashion. The district court had held that an express provision for the
continuation of management is indispensable to an association.' 9 The
court of appeals rejected this reasoning, basing its decision on a balancing
of the corporate and noncorporate characteristics of the group.20 This
approach accords with the underlying theory of the new regulations, which
require a finding that an organization has "more corporate characteristics
than noncorporate characteristics" before it can be classified as an associa-
14 Instant case at 859.
15 Sneed, spra note 13, at 170; Shepherd, supra note 1, at 240.
1 6 TAuBmAN, TaE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLAssICATIoN 265-68 (1957);
Bruen, Federal Income Tax Aspects of Oil and Gas Ventures-A Summary for the
Investor, 14 TAx L. Ray. 353, 370 (1959) ; Early, supra note 1, at 460-62. See gen-
erally Barnhill, Taxation of Oil and Gas Operating Agreements-The Scope and
Application of LT. 3930, 27 Rocyx MT. L. Rtv. 133 (1954). See also Sneed, supra
note 13, at 181-94, discussing the possible scope of applicability of these rulings and
criticizing their emphasis on the revocability of the authority of the coowners' repre-
sentative.
17 The court summarily dismissed the rulings with the statement that they have
"attempted to regulate by example," and thus "are largely negative in approach."
Instant case at 859. However, it is not easy to see how the differences between the
organizations described in the rulings and the one in the present case, see note 9
mpra, materially affect the applicability of the rulings to this case. The trial court
had also distinguished away these rulings without stating in what manner the differ-
ences involved would render using them improper. 181 F. Supp. at 775.
18 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960). The new regulations apply only to taxable
years beginning after 1960; thus they were not applied to the present case, which
involved a 1954 tax return. Prior regulations were not useful in the present case;
they are no more than general restatements of case law. See Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.3797-2 (1943), as amended, T.D. 5468, 1945 CuM. BuL.. 332, readopted verbatim
as Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2 (1953).
19 181 F. Supp. at 774. But see Thrash Lease Trust v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d
925 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 654 (1939) ; Wholesalers Adjustment Co.
v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1937).
20 There was no dispute over three of the attributes. Limited liability and cen-
tralization of title were dearly absent, and transferability of interests had been
expressly provided for. Centralization of management and continuity of life were
also found to be present on the grounds that they had been achieved in practice. The
court cited cases in which the absence of either limited liability or centralization of
title had not precluded classifying groups as corporations, and held that the absence
of these attributes was not decisive here. Instant case at 858-59; see note 13 supra.
1961]
132 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110
tion.21 In order to mitigate the effect of artfully drawn governing instru-
ments which cloak the practical workings of an enterprise in noncorporate
forms, the courts have scrutinized the various features of hybrid enter-
prises "in the light of the setting and circumstances" involved in each
case.22  Accordingly, as it had done in determining that the venture
had a joint profit objective, the court in the present case looked to the
group's actual practices in judging corporate resemblance.
In setting forth the criteria for finding centralized management, the
new regulations require that "continuing exclusive authority" 2 be vested
in a small group, but offer no standards for determining when authority
can be deemed "continuing." Generally, either an express provision for
managerial succession or a placing of managerial duties in a preexisting
corporation has been required. 4  Though neither of these conditions
existed in the instant case, the venture could have been conducted by
any two of the three attorneys-in-fact, and the death or incapacity of one
of them would not have disrupted its management. For this reason the
court found that "centralized and continuing management [was] contem-
plated and accomplished in fact . .. , 25 despite the lack of any provi-
sion for the perpetuation of management. The court did not enumerate the
facts that led to this conclusion, but it must have been based on a prediction
that effective central management could be maintained for the time required
to exploit the leases. 26 The court approached continuity of life from a
similarly functional point of view. Although a coowner's death or an
express revocation or sale of his interest would have served to revoke the
power of the attorneys-in-fact to act for the interest involved, revocation
by a small number of investors would not have put an end to group
endeavorsm Thus the court found that a continuing entity in fact
2 1 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960). For an organization like the present
to be classified as an association, these regulations require it to have a joint profit
objective and three of the four following corporate characteristics: (a) centralization
of management, (b) continuity of life, (c) at least a modified form of free trans-
ferability, and (d) limited liability. The new regulations do not consider common
title to property subjected to group purposes a significant characteristic and the
requirement that management be representative has disappeared. See generally Saltz,
Associations, 38 TAXES 187 (1960); Zarky, Unincorporated Organizations Taxable
as Corporatioms, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAx INsT. 277; 34 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 372 (1960).
2 2 Reynolds v. Hill, 184 F.2d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 1950) ("business trust!' held
taxable as a corporation); see Thrash Lease Trust v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 925
(9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 654 (1938) (trust implied by the court and
held to be taxable as a corporation).
2 4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).
24 See, e.g., Wabash Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 658 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 843 (1947); Commissioner v. Fortney Oil Co., 125 F.2d 995
(6th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Horseshoe Lease Syndicate, 110 F.2d 748 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 666 (1940). But see Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v.
Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945), (semble); Thrash Lease Trust v.
Commissioner, 99 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 654 (1938).
25 Instant case at 859.
2 6 See Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-3.
27 Id. p. 3 n.1.
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existed.28 The court's treatment of these two corporate attributes adds a
new dimension to the inquiry; not only are practical realities considered,
but they are measured against the needs and purposes of a specific business
organization, not against abstract definitions of corporate characteristics.
TAXATION: ENFORCEMENT-STATuTE GIVING DISTRICT
COURTS JURISDICTION OF GoVERNmENT SuTs FOR BACK TAXES
CoNTEMPLATEs ACTION AT LAw TRIABi TO A JURY
The United States brought an action in a federal district court1
against petitioners, husband and wife, to adjudge them liable for various
taxes, penalties, and interest assessed, to establish and foreclose tax liens
on real property of the wife, to determine that the properties were trans-
ferred in fraud of creditors, and to set the transfers aside. When peti-
tioners' timely demand for jury trial was stricken on motion of the Gov-
ernment,2 they sought a writ of mandamus directing the district judge to
vacate his order. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
insofar as the complaint sought to establish and foreclose tax liens against
the wife's realty and to set aside her conveyances as fraudulent, the wife
was not entitled to a jury trial even as to her personal liability, nor was
the husband so entitled as joint obligor of taxes which constituted the lien
against the wife's realty, since the relief sought was equitable in nature.
But as to the judgment sought against the husband for taxes, penalties,
and interest, for which he was solely liable, the petition was granted on the
ground that Congress, in authorizing a court proceeding for a tax judgment,
contemplated a simple action of debt, with its historic right to jury trial.
Darnsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961) .a
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a unitary
civil action in federal district courts,4 without distinguishing between law
and equity,5 the right to jury trial continues to be affected by the manner in
2 8 In the present case, the entire dispute was over the nature of the organization
as a whole and not over whether the individual being taxed was related to the group
as a stockholder is to a corporation. Cases in this area do not indicate the correct
tax treatment of a tenant in common who actually operates or directs the operation
of his own interest. No taxpayer has made this contention in any reported cases.
However, the cases do not preclude such a person from showing that he is managing
his own share of the enterprise. See Sneed, mupra note 13, at 181-82.
1 Under INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 6502, which provides that after a tax assess-
ment has been made, "such tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in
court . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1958), which gives federal district courts original
jurisdiction of "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for
internal revenue . . . ," and INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7403, which provides for
the enforcement of federal tax liens in federal district courts.
2 United States v. Damsky, 187 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
3 Clark, J., dissented from the majority opinion of Friendly, J.
4 Fm. R. Civ. P. 2.
5 The rules allow the splitting of an action into issues which may be tried sepa-
rately, some with and some without jury. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(c), 39, 42(b); see,
e.g., Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952).
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which the claims stated in the complaint would have been characterized
when the seventh amendment was adopted; 6 a common-law form of action
does not lose its identity by being incorporated in a federal statute.7 Gen-
erally, an action to recover damages granted by statute is "recognized as
constituting, in conceptual nature and legal attributes," a common-law
action of debt, unless the statute expressly casts it in "some special and
different form." s One such "different form" is the equity suit.9
The majority in the present case concluded that foreclosure of a tax
lien1 0 is akin to foreclosure of a mortgagor's equity of redemption, "an
established head of equity jurisdiction well before 1791." 1" The same
conclusion, based on convincing authority, was drawn with respect to the
prayers that the allegedly fraudulent conveyances be set aside and that
deficiency judgments be rendered against both spouses.12 No jury was
allowed for these claims. The alleged sole liability of the husband, how-
ever, had no connection with a lien on any property of his. It was there-
fore treated as an ordinary action for a money judgment, which is generally
considered to be one at law.' 3 The majority undertook to analogize the
claim in the present case to its historical counterpart. After tracing English
exchequer proceedings from the twelfth century to colonial days and
demonstrating that a suit by the Crown to recover a judgment for taxes
was usually in the form of a common-law action of debt, tried by a jury,' 4
the court concluded that, since the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provided
a judicial proceeding for tax collection similar to an action of debt,15
Congress must be presumed, in the absence of any expression to the con-
trary, to have complied with the spirit of the seventh amendment guarantee
6 See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935);
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet) 433
(1830).
7 See Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Orenstein v. United States,
191 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Mesna, 11 F.R.D. 86 (D. Minn. 1950).
Compare United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950) (jury allowed
on issue of treble damages for violation of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942),
with United States v. Friedman, 89 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (jury demand
denied on issue of treble damages under Housing and Rent Act of 1947).
8 Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 1952).
9 See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet) 433 (1830).
10 Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7403.
11 Instant case at 53; accord, United States v. Malakie, 188 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.
N.Y. 1960).
12 Instant case at 53-57. The majority relied heavily on Young v. Vail, 29 N.M.
324, 222 Pac. 912 (1924), which analyzed previous decisions denying equity's power
to render deficiency judgments and demonstrated that they were all either baseless or
founded upon a misreading of English law by Chancellor Kent in Dunidey v. Van
Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 330 (N.Y. 1818).
13 See Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891).
34 Instant case at 49-51. There is ample support for the proposition that taxes
due the federal government constitute a personal liability for which the Government
may bring a debt action. See, e.g., Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926) ;
United States v. Chamberlain, 219 U.S. 250 (1911); Viles v. Commissioner, 233
F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
15 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6502(a).
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of trial by jury of such a claim.1 But the dissent reasoned that since
Congress had expressly provided for jury trial in only one area of tax
collection-refund suits against the Government-its silence elsewhere
indicated that jury trial was not contemplated in any other area, including
the one at issue.17 The legislative history of the 1954 enactment provid-
ing for jury trial in tax refund suits does not support this argument. That
provision, drafted as an exception to the general rule prohibiting juries in
suits against the United States,' was meant to correct an irrational dis-
tinction in prior law. Refund suits may be brought against either the
District Director (formerly the Collector) or the United States.19 On the
merits, the issues are the same in either action. Yet before 1954, the tax-
payer's right to a jury trial depended on whether the nominal defendant
was the United States or one of its officers 20 Recognizing that a suit
against the Collector was in effect a suit against the Government, 2 Con-
gress, apparently disinclined to attempt withdrawal of the right to a jury
trial in suits against the Collector, remedied the inequality by authorizing a
jury in tax refund cases against the United States.2 2 This history casts
serious doubt on the argument that Congress, in expressly providing a jury
trial in this situation alone, intended to exclude the jury from suits in which
the United States is plaintiff.
If, as the dissent reasoned, the silence of Congress in the section under
which this action was brought indicated an intention to create a cause of
action for the Government unrestricted by a corresponding right in the
defendant to trial by jury, it would be impossible to avoid the constitutional
question of whether the seventh amendment would permit such a statute.
The majority, however, avoided this question by construing the statute in
16The dissent objected that the "modern all-inclusive civil action under the
federal rules does not look like the old writ of debt . . ." and characterized the
majority's reasoning as "logistic bootstrap lifting." Instant case at 59 (dissenting
opinion). For similar argument that not all actions or statutory proceedings can be
equated to the law of 1791, see Olshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23, 28 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960); Walston, The Use of Juries in Federal
Civil Income Tax Cases, 39 TAxES 144 (1961).
17Instant case at 57 & rLI (dissenting opinion).
18Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 161, §2402, 62 Stat. 971 (1948), providing that "any
action against the United States under section 1346 [giving original jurisdiction to
district courts in certain suits against the United States] . . . shall be tried by the
court without a jury," was amended in 1954 to provide for a jury trial at the request
of either party in actions for tax refunds under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1). See 28
U.S.C. §2402 (1958).
39 The history of this anomaly is traced in Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against
Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 HARV. L. Rlv. 685 (1947).
20 Id. at 702; see Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927).
21H.R REP. No. 2276, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The House originally
amended the Senate bill to allow the Collector to be sued in the taxpayer's own
district. This provision would have made it easier for most taxpayers to try their
refund claims to a jury, without allowing jury trials in suits nominally against the
United States. See H.R. REP. No. 659, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). However, the
House conferees concluded that there was "no more danger of excessive jury verdicts
in cases where the Government itself is sued than in cases where the collecting officer
of the Government is sued." H.R. REaP. No. 2276, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1954).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1958) (judgments against Collectors to be paid by the
Treasury with no execution permitted against Collectors).
22Note 18 supra.
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a way harmonious with the seventh amendment, insisting that something
more than silence would be required to indicate an intention by Congress
to oust the jury in the face of the constitutional guarantee.2 The dissent
reached the constitutional question.2 It suggested that the 1927 case of
Wickwire v. Reinecke 25 had so construed the seventh amendment as to
give Congress carte blanche in devising actions by the Government to re-
cover taxes.2 6 But the Wickwire dictum that "it is within the undoubted
power of Congress to provide any reasonable system for the collection of
taxes and recovery of them when illegal, without a jury . . . ," 27 pro-
vided due process is afforded, does not properly allow the broad construc-
tion claimed by the dissent. Wickwire was a refund suit by a taxpayer
against the Collector of Internal Revenue in which the Court held that the
taxpayer had adduced sufficient evidence to take his case to the jury.
Answering a procedural point, the Court said that the taxpayer's right to a
jury trial was not found in the seventh amendment, but was implied from
the statutory provision.28  The decisions cited to support the statement of
congressional power to provide for the collection of taxes "without a jury
trial" arose either from summary administrative proceedings 29 or from
suits against the United States.3 0 "The right of the United States to collect
its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has long been
settled," 31 and such proceedings need not provide for jury trial. Thus,
there is no jury in the Tax Court, which was established under article I
"as an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government" 32
and is not a court, despite its quasi-judicial functions and powers.33 Fur-
ther, it is admittedly true that suits against the Government are not con-
trolled by the seventh amendment.3 4 Under the doctrine of sovereign
23 Instant case at 52.
24 Instant case at 58 (dissenting opinion).
25275 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1927).
26 Instant case at 58 (dissenting opinion).
27 275 U.S. at 106.
2
8 Id. at 105.
29 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1855), held that a warrant of distress from the Treasury was not a judicial pro-
ceeding subject to the fifth amendment, but was a summary proceeding which did
not violate due process. 'We apprehend there has been no period, since the estab-
lishment of the English monarchy, when there has not been . . . a summary method
for the recovery of debts due to the crown . . . ." Id. at 277.
30 ichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1868), held that a written
protest was a condition precedent to a refund suit in the Court of Claims, since the
Government could attach any conditions to the privilege of suing it. Cheatham v.
United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875), held that the taxpayer had no right of action
against the Collector since he failed to appeal or sue within six months of the assess-
ment, as required by statute. "It will be readily conceded . . . that the government
has the right to prescribe the conditions on which it will be subject itself to the
judgment of the courts in the collection of its revenues." Id. at 88-89.
3 1 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595, 599 & n.9 (1931); see note 29
.supra.
3 2 1NT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7441, 7453.
33 See Reo Motors v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1955).
34 McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880) ; see note 30 .mpra.
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immunity, there could be no suit against the government at common law,
and, therefore, in such actions no right to a jury was preserved. This fact,
however, does not dictate the denial of jury trial in a suit brought by the
sovereign in a court of its own creation. The broad dicta in Wickwire re-
affirmed the accepted proposition that when the Government chooses to
move against a taxpayer summarily, it can do so without violating due
process.3 5  But Wickwire begged the question of whether the seventh
amendment is applicable when the Government, instead of proceeding out-
side the framework of common-law actions, invokes the judicial power of
a court established under article III. The decision cannot, therefore, be
read as construing away the right to jury in all tax collection cases.
Even if Congress were to agree with the dissent in the present case that
the use of juries in tax cases is "inconvenient and burdensome," 3 6 it is not
certain that it could escape the requirement of the seventh amendment
merely by the express indication of an intention to do so. And it is unlikely
that Congress would go to the length of devising special administrative or
equitable proceedings just to curb the use of jury trial; in fact, there is
evidence that the present policy is to extend, rather than curtail the use of
the jury in tax actions.
37
35 See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272 (1855); cf. Olshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 855 (1960) : "There is no right to a jury trial . . . at
all in tax matters as a constitutional requirement . . . ." The court is speaking,
however, of "civil proceedings for the collection of penalties . . . [and] the deter-
mination of the facts upon which the liability for such a penalty is based . . . by
executive officers or administrative agencies," not by courts. Ibid. See 1 DAvis,
ADmINiSTRATVE LAW 594 & n.3 (1958) (adjudication by administrative agencies);
Walston, supra note 16, at 159.
3 6 Instant case at 59 (dissenting opinion). See Walston, supra note 16, at 146-53,
where it is argued that juries in tax refund cases prevent equal treatment of tax-
payers, decide issues which are often not really factual, and are overly generous to
the taxpayers at the considerable expense of the Government. But see id. at 164 n.80;
note 21 supra. For argument in favor of jury trial in tax controversies, see Angell,
Procedural Reform i; the Judicial Review of Controversies Under the Internal Reve-
nue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal, 34 ILL. L. REv. 151, 154-55 (1939).
3 7 An outspoken critic of the role of the jury in tax suits has admitted that "the
1954 legislation [is] a fairly strong statement of 'legislative intent' . . . that the
taxpayer should have open to him as many chances as possible to employ a jury in
his tax suit if he so desires." Walston, sutpra note 16, at 157.
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